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Political belief systems lay at the heart of multiple disciplines 
including social psychology, political science, and sociology. 
They can encourage or obstruct social movements and social 
changes as they reflect people’s social circumstances and pro-
vide people with a lens to view the world (Duckitt & Sibley, 
2010; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; Kahan, Peters, Dawson, 
& Slovic, 2017). Although different disciplines, and even 
scholars within the same discipline, have different definitions 
for political belief systems and related terms (e.g., ideology, 
worldview), they tend to converge on the idea that belief sys-
tems are the interrelationships of attitudes and beliefs relevant 
to politics (Gerring, 1997). In this article, we integrate 
research that models psychological phenomena as networks 
with the idea that belief systems are defined by the interrela-
tionships of attitudes and beliefs to understand what is central 
to political belief systems. Identifying the central components 
of political belief systems is important because it informs us 
about how people reason about political issues (Bartels, 2002; 
Hatemi & McDermott, 2016; Kahan et al., 2017) and the 
components most likely to affect their political decisions 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Converse, 
1964, 2000; Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). 
A deeper understanding of the central feature (or features) of 
political belief systems would also inform people’s reactions 
to political events (Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015), and their 
positions on new policy proposals (Cohen, 2003; Malka & 
Lelkes, 2010).
Operational or Symbolic Components as Central?
Given these implications, scholars from multiple disciplines 
over the last six decades have worked to identify if the opera-
tional components (i.e., positions on specific issues, such as 
government spending) or symbolic components (i.e., affec-
tive attachments to political groups and labels, such as ideo-
logical identification or party identification) are most central 
to political belief systems. Said another way, are political 
issues or political identities at the center of political belief 
systems? Traditionally, the centrality question is tested by 
examining how strongly operational and symbolic measures 
are associated with key outcomes, such as voting behavior 
(Campbell et al., 1960; Jost, 2006; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017) 
and negative views of ideological rivals (Mason, 2018); how 
operational and symbolic measures respond to experimental 
manipulations of the political context (Cohen, 2003; Huddy 
et al., 2015; Malka & Lelkes, 2010); or by testing if symbolic 
measures are more likely to cause changes to (and therefore 
be more central to) operational measures and vice versa 
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(Chen & Goren, 2016; Converse, 1964; Highton & Kam, 
2011; Jackson, 1975). A central challenge for these methods 
of identifying core components of a belief system is examin-
ing the position of the components within the structure of the 
belief system as a whole. Because prior methods do not over-
come this challenge, the relationships identified in past 
research may be on the periphery of the system.
Belief Systems as Networks
One solution to this challenge is to directly model the inter-
relationships of attitudes and beliefs relevant to politics (i.e., 
the political belief system) as a network of interacting nodes 
(see Boutyline & Vaisey, 2017 for the first use of this general 
approach). We treat each node as a measure of an operational 
or symbolic component of the belief system. The belief sys-
tem then consists of all of the relevant nodes and their con-
nections with one another. This approach integrates work 
distinguishing symbolic and operational components of 
belief systems (e.g., Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Sears, 1993) 
with research modeling psychopathologies (Borsboom & 
Cramer, 2013), personality (Cramer et al., 2012), and single 
attitudes (Dalege et al., 2015) as networks. It has several dis-
tinct advantages.
First, a network approach successfully operationalizes the 
definition of political belief systems. By modeling belief sys-
tems as a network, we can explicitly model the interrelation-
ships between the attitudes and beliefs relevant to politics.
Second, the network approach easily accommodates 
many belief system components within the analysis. 
Specifically, multiple operational and symbolic beliefs, as 
well as their interrelationships, can be modeled simultane-
ously. This allows for the possible recognition of multiple 
central and peripheral constructs, as well as constructs that 
might be somewhere in the middle of the central–peripheral 
continuum.
Third, by modeling belief systems as networks, we can 
adopt measures of network centrality from network science 
that are used to assess centrality within the structure of a 
broad array of systems (Barrat, Barthelemy, Pastor-Satorras, 
& Vespignani, 2004; Borgatti, 2005; Newman, 2010; Opsahl, 
Agneessens, & Skvoretz, 2010). Because belief systems are 
interrelationships between attitudes and beliefs, measures of 
centrality should take into account where a component is 
within that web of interrelationships. Centrality indicators 
from network science do just that, by identifying how a par-
ticular node is embedded within the network.
We focus on three centrality indicators that have been 
used in past work on psychological networks (e.g., Boutyline 
& Vaisey, 2017; Costantini, Epskamp, et al., 2015; cf. 
Freeman, 1978): strength, closeness, and betweenness cen-
trality. Strength centrality is the sum of the absolute value of 
the edge weights that directly connect to a node (Barrat et al., 
2004; Newman, 2010), and is an indicator of the immediate 
connections and potential influences a belief system 
component has on its neighbors. The other two measures of 
centrality are related to the position of the node within the 
overall structure of the belief system network. Closeness 
centrality is the inverse of the sum of the distance between a 
node and all other nodes (Borgatti, 2005), thereby represent-
ing how “quickly” the influence of a particular component 
can get from one component of the belief system to the rest 
of the components in the system. Betweenness centrality is 
the number of shortest paths that pass through a node between 
two other nodes (Borgatti, 2005). Higher betweenness thus 
captures how necessary the belief system component is for 
linking together the other parts of the belief system.
Although strength centrality may be an important prop-
erty of belief system networks, closeness and betweenness 
centrality are theoretically most closely related to belief sys-
tem scholars’ understanding of centrality. Whereas strength 
centrality taps into the embeddedness of a belief system 
component in its particular region of the belief system, close-
ness and betweenness centrality assess how well a compo-
nent can tie components from disparate regions of the belief 
system together and influence the network as a whole. This 
is consistent with Converse’s (1964) description of the cen-
trality of belief system components as “the role that they play 
in the belief system as a whole” (p. 208, emphasis added). 
For example, a component with high betweenness can serve 
as a bridge between different regions of the belief system, 
thereby helping to form a single belief system rather than 
multiple nonoverlapping belief systems. This is different 
from other descriptions of centrality, including those pro-
vided by Converse, that identify central variables as being 
more causally potent. Causal potency does not necessarily 
say anything about centrality, as the causally potent variable 
may be on the periphery of the belief system. Only by model-
ing the whole system as a network are we able to locate com-
ponents within the broader belief system.
Hypotheses
Critically, modeling belief systems as networks enables us to 
test two key hypotheses. The operational centric hypothesis 
predicts that operational components of the belief system (i.e., 
support or opposition for specific policy issues) will be the 
most central. This is supported by work showing that people 
adopt party affiliations (Chen & Goren, 2016) and ideological 
identifications (e.g., identification as right wing or left wing; 
De Vries, Hakhverdian, & Lancee, 2013) to fit their issue posi-
tions and that issue positions are reliably associated with vote 
choice (Ansolabehere, Rodden, & Snyder, 2008), especially 
for competitive elections (Lachat, 2011). Conversely, the sym-
bolic centric hypothesis predicts that symbolic components of 
the belief system will be the most central. This is supported by 
work showing that people adopt issue positions that match 
their party affiliations (Cohen, 2003) or ideological identifica-
tions (Malka & Lelkes, 2010; see also Zaller, 1992) and that 
symbolic components of belief systems, such as party and 
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ideological identification, are strongly associated with vote 
choice (Campbell et al., 1960; Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 
2002; Jost, 2006; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017) and other political 
cognitions, emotions, and behaviors (Brandt, 2017; Huddy 
et al., 2015; Kahan et al., 2017; Mason, 2015, 2018). This 
hypothesis suggests that identities and symbolic attachments 
are at the core of belief systems and that support for specific 
issues emanate from them.
Although these two hypotheses are phrased in their stark-
est terms, it is important to recognize that centrality is not a 
binary designation within a network approach to belief sys-
tems. There are degrees of centrality. As such, even within 
symbolic and operational categories, there will be variation 
in the extent to which a particular node is central.
To help triangulate on the answer to our research ques-
tion, we will also test how symbolic and operational compo-
nents of the belief system are associated with political 
behaviors. Scholars have suggested that central (vs. periph-
eral) components of political belief systems are more strongly 
related to political behaviors (Campbell et al., 1960; Jost, 
2006; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). The quintessential political 
behavior in democracies is voting. If symbolic or operational 
components tend to be more central than the other type of 
component, then the more central component should be 
closer in the network to voting behavior (Converse, 1964; 
Jost, 2006; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017).
It may also be possible to extend this idea to other types 
of behavior that may not be so clearly relevant to the belief 
system. For example, although environmental behavior is 
not obviously tied to politics, environmental attitudes are 
often part of people’s political belief systems (Hornsey, 
Harris, Bain, & Fielding, 2016) and environmental behavior 
is often connected with people’s political views (Dietz, Stern, 
& Guagnano, 1998; Kahn, 2007; Kidwell, Farmer, & 
Hardesty, 2013; Scott & Willits, 1994; Van Liere & Dunlap, 
1980). Similarly, although it is not necessary for religious 
behavior to be tied to political behavior, in practice, it appears 
that people’s religious and political belief systems are related 
(Brandt & Reyna, 2014; Malka & Soto, 2011; Mason & 
Wronski, 2018). Therefore, we also tested if the findings for 
voting behavior translate to other potentially relevant behav-
ior, such as environmental and religious behavior. If the find-
ings do extend to these domains, it provides suggestive 
evidence that what is central to belief systems is also central 
to nonpolitical, yet nonetheless consequential, behaviors.
Prior Work on Political Belief System Networks
Although distinct from the aims of the current study, prior work 
has tested the related hypothesis about whether the American 
political belief system developed from ideological identifica-
tion or authoritarian parenting values using a network approach 
(Boutyline & Vaisey, 2017). Using data from the 2000 
American National Election Studies, these scholars find 
that ideological identification is the most betweenness-central 
component of the belief system, whereas authoritarian parent-
ing values are on the periphery of the belief system. Given the 
assumptions specified in this prior work, this finding suggests 
that ideological identification is the developmental starting 
point of the American political belief system.
In this article, we extend this work in several ways. First, 
to test the operational centric and symbolic centric hypothe-
ses, we focused our model of a political belief system net-
work on both symbolic (party support, ideological 
identification) and operational (support for specific issues 
and policies) components. This allows us to focus on con-
structs core to the definition of political belief systems 
(Converse, 1964; Ellis & Stimson, 2012) that make up the 
bulk of the work teasing apart these hypotheses (e.g., Kinder 
& Kalmoe, 2017). Second, we extend our analysis of belief 
system centrality beyond indicators of network centrality to 
also investigate how closely symbolic and operational com-
ponents are to voting behavior, a key political behavior, as 
well as extend this idea to self-reported environmental and 
religious behavior. Third, to model the complexity of belief 
systems in modern multiparty democracies, we analyzed 
data from the New Zealand attitudes and values study 
(NZAVS), a representative longitudinal panel study of the 
New Zealand voting age population between 2009 and 2016 
(Sibley, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c) Fourth, and relatedly, we are 
able to examine how the models replicate across the years 
available in the NZAVS. Each wave contained between six 
and 10 items that assess symbolic components of political 
belief systems, and 16 and 30 items that assess operational 
components of political belief systems.
Method
Data
Waves 1 (2009) through 7 (2015) of the NZAVS were ana-
lyzed. The NZAVS was approved by The University of 
Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee (Reference 
Numbers: 01488 and 6171). Participants with data on at least 
one belief system component in the wave were included in 
the analyses (see Table 1 for demographic information) and 
missing data were estimated using full information maxi-
mum likelihood estimation as a part of the analyses (see 
Table S1 in Supplemental Material for percentage of missing 
data per item). This survey is a multiyear longitudinal panel 
study based on a representative sample of New Zealand. For 
information about its representativeness and data collection 
procedures, see the survey’s extensive documentation 
(Sibley, 2014b, 2014c). For a brief summary of the political 
situation in New Zealand, see the Supplemental Materials.
Measures
For each wave of the survey, we identified all of the items 
assessing symbolic and operational components of the 
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political belief system. Items were considered symbolic if 
they tapped into people’s support for, or identification with, 
political groups (i.e., parties) or labels (e.g., liberals; Ellis & 
Stimson, 2012). Items were considered operational if they 
tapped into people’s support for a policy that could be 
enacted politically (Ellis & Stimson, 2012). All items, their 
classification as symbolic or operational, and the wave(s) 
they were included in are found in Table 2. All items were 
coded so that higher scores represent more conservative 
positions in the New Zealand context. See Sibley (2014a) for 
the original materials for the NZAVS.
In 2011, New Zealand held an election to decide the 
nation’s next prime minister. We aimed to use measures of 
symbolic and operational components of belief systems from 
the wave taken before the election (Time 3) or the wave after 
the election (Time 4) and integrate them with measures of 
self-reported voting behavior, environmental behavior, and 
religious behavior taken after the election (Time 4). Using 
postelection voting behavior will presumably capture 
responses closer to their actual voting behavior as opposed to 
their anticipated voting behavior (see Sibley et al., 2017, on 
the correspondence between the NZAVS, other polling data, 
and election results). Voting behavior was measured by ask-
ing each participant who reported having voted in the most 
recent election to indicate the party for whom they voted. We 
included all of the possible parties that participants selected 
with the exception of Jim Anderton’s Progressive Party and 
the United Party (in the combined Wave 3 and 4 data), which 
were added to the Other category because of their low num-
bers. Participants who were unsure who they voted for (or 
who did not report who they voted for) were removed from 
the analyses using voting behavior. Environmental behavior 
was measured with two items that read, “Have you made sac-
rifices to your standard of living (e.g., accepted higher prices, 
driven less, conserved energy) in order to protect the environ-
ment?” and “Have you made changes to your daily routine in 
order to protect the environment?” Both were measured on a 
scale from 1 (definitely no) to 7 (definitely yes). Religious 
behavior was assessed by asking participants, “how many 
times did you attend a church or place of worship in the last 
month?” Any of the open-ended responses equal to or greater 
than 5 were recoded as 5.
Results1
What Is Most Central?
Network estimation. We estimate a network that consists of 
regularized partial correlation coefficients. The individual 
items were treated as nodes and the edges connecting them 
were estimated as regularized partial correlations, such that 
each edge represents the undirected association between 
each node while controlling for the influence of all of the 
other nodes in the network (Epskamp, & Fried, 2018; Laurit-
zen, 1996; for a tutorial, see Epskamp, Borsboom, & Fried, 
2018). This modeling approach assumes that nodes in the 
belief system mutually influence each other and like to be in 
the same state as their neighbors (e.g., if two nodes are posi-
tively connected, they are likely to share the same liberal/
conservative state). The first step in the network estimation 
procedure is to estimate a correlation matrix. For ordinal 
variables (variables with six or fewer integer values were 
treated as ordinal), polychoric correlations are estimated. 
This is the stage where missing data are estimated using full 
information maximum likelihood estimation. Then, the cor-
relation matrix is inverted to create a partial correlation 
matrix and a LASSO (least absolute shrinkage and selection 
operator) regularization procedure, borrowed from machine 
learning, helps to control the possibility of spurious effects 
and shrinks small coefficients to zero (Costantini, Epskamp, 
et al., 2015; Epskamp & Fried, 2018). The networks for each 
wave were estimated using the qgraph and bootnet packages 
(default gamma tuning parameter = .5). The stability of the 
networks was estimated using the bootnet package (see Sup-
plemental Materials).
An approach based on partial correlations, such as the one 
we are using here, is ideal for data that are continuous or quasi-
continuous. This estimates a network that is linked by the unique 
associations between each of the nodes. The approach performs 
well in simulation studies (Schmittmann, Jahfari, Borsboom, 
Savi, & Waldorp, 2015; see also simulation in Supplemental 
Materials) and outperforms other similar methods (e.g., net-
works estimated using only correlations). The method we use is 
the most often used method to estimate network connections in 
a wide range of networks, including the networks that comprise 
individual attitudes (e.g., Dalege et al., 2015), personality traits 
(e.g., Costantini, Richetin, et al., 2015), and psychopathologies 
(e.g., Fried et al., 2018; see also Epskamp, Waldorp, Mõttus, & 
Borsboom, 2017; Epskamp & Fried, 2018; Foygel & Drton, 
2010; Friedman, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2008; Lauritzen, 1996; 
Meinshausen & Bühlmann, 2006).
Seven networks were estimated, one for each wave of 
available data (see Figures S1 and S2 in Supplemental 
Material). See Supplemental Materials for visualizations and 
robustness checks of the networks. We estimated the three 
Table 1. Demographic Information for the Seven Waves of the 
NZAVS Used in This Study.
Wave n M age SD age Women Men
1 6,510 48.1 15.7 3,873 2,637
2 4,441 51.0 15.2 7,235 1,706
3 6,884 50.5 15.9 4,303 2,578
4 12,162 49.1 15.0 7,611 4,549
5 18,258 47.7 14.1 11,458 6,797
6 15,701 49.4 14.0 9,924 5,757
7 13,920 50.8 13.9 8,709 5,192
Note. Discrepancies between the number of women and men and the full 
sample are due to missing data. NZAVS = New Zealand attitudes and 
values study.
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Table 2. The Items Analyzed and the Waves That Were Available.
Variables Label Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Total Coding
Symbolic components
 Support for National Party pNat X X X X X X X 7  
 Support for Labor Party pLab X X X X X X X 7 R
 Support for Green Party pGre X X X X X X X 7 R
 Support for ACT Party pACT X X X X X X 6  
 Support for Māori party pMao X X X X X X X 7 R
 Support for United Future Party pUni X X 2  
 Support for New Zealand First Party pNZ1 X X X X 4  
 Support for Mana Party pMan X X 2 R
 Support for Conservative Party pCon X X 2  
 Liberal/Conservative identification IdID X X X X X X X 7  
 Right-wing/Left-wing identification RwID X X X X X 5  
Operational components
 Maori ownership of the seabed and 
foreshore
MSea X X X X X X X 7 R
 Reserving places for Maori students to 
study medicine
MMed X X X X X X X 7 R
 Rates exemptions on Maori land MLnd X X X X X X X 7 R
 Crown (government) ownership of the 
seabed and foreshore
CSea X X X X X X X 7  
 Performance of the Haka at international 
sports events
Haka X X X X X X X 7 R
 Waitangi Day as a national celebration of 
biculturalism
WaiD X X X X X X X 7 R
 Teaching Maori language in New Zealand 
primary schools
Mlan X X X X X X X 7 R
 Singing the national anthem in Maori and 
English
NatA X X X X X X X 7 R
 Incentives to increase women’s 
participation in the paid workforce (paid 
for by government)
Winc X X X X X X X 7 R
 Introducing a program to enhance 
sustainable business growth among 
businesses owned and operated by 
women
Wbus X X X X X X X 7 R
 Affirmative action policies for 
women promoting entry into female 
underrepresented occupations, such as 
construction and the trades
WAA X 1 R
 The Civil Union Act CiU X X X X X X 6 R
 Same-sex marriage in New Zealand (The 
Marriage Amendment Act 2013)
SSM X X X 3 R
 The current antismacking bill. (i.e., it 
being illegal to smack children)
Asmk X X X X X 5 R
 Including religious instruction in 
Christianity as part of the school 
curriculum.
ReEd X X X X X X 6  
 Legalized abortion for women, regardless 
of the reason
Aany X X X X X 5 R
 Legalized abortion when the woman’s life 
is endangered
Asp X X X X X 5 R
 A “flat” tax rate (everyone pays the same 
percentage of tax on their income)
Tax X X X X 4  
 Policies promoting closer trade ties 
between India and New Zealand
IndT X X X X X X 6 R
 (continued)
6 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
Variables Label Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Total Coding
 Policies promoting closer trade ties 
between China and New Zealand
ChiT X X X X X X 6 R
 Policies promoting more immigration 
from India to New Zealand
IndI X X X X X X 6 R
 Policies promoting more immigration 
from China to New Zealand
ChiI X X X X X X 6 R
 Government initiatives to inform and 
promote healthy lifestyle choices
GovH X X X 3 R
 Do you think foreign investors should be 
able to buy New Zealand farms?
IFF X 1 1 = yes, 
0 = no
 Restricting foreign ownership of New 
Zealand farms
ForF X X 2 R
 Restricting foreign ownership of New 
Zealand residential property
ForR X X 2 R
 Increase payments for those receiving 
jobseeker support (formerly the 
Unemployment Benefit).
PayJ X 1  
 Increase payments for those receiving 
sole parent support (formerly the 
Domestic Purposes Benefit).
PayP X 1  
 Redistributing money and wealth more 
evenly among a larger percentage of the 
people in New Zealand through heavy 
taxes on the rich
IncR X X 2 R
 Suppose a person has a painful incurable 
disease, do you think that doctors should 
be allowed by law to end the patient’s 
life if the patient requests it?
Euth X 1 R
 Ensuring that all food and food 
ingredients sold in New Zealand are free 
from genetically modified organisms
GMO X X 2 R
 The current “3 Strikes” law for violent/
sexual offenses, where the maximum 
possible sentence must be imposed 
without parole upon the third conviction
3stk X 1  
 A publicly available online database of all 
convicted sex offenders in New Zealand
SexO X 1  
 The New Zealand government should be 
involved in regulating carbon emissions
CarR X X X X X X 6 R
 Increased government spending on new 
motorways
MtrS X X X 3 R
 Government subsidy of public transport PubT X X X 3 R
 Protecting New Zealand’s native species 
should be a national priority
NatS X X 2 R
 Do you support the use of 1080 poison 
for possum control in New Zealand?
PosC X X 2 R
Nodes per wave 23 28 26 33 37 40 31  
Note. With one exception (noted in table), all items are on a 1 to 7 scale. R = reverse score.
Table 2. (continued)
types of centrality discussed above with methods for 
weighted networks (Opsahl et al., 2010) for each of the seven 
networks. Then, we tested to see if symbolic or operational 
components tended to have higher levels of centrality.
Hypothesis testing. Figure 1 plots the centrality estimates for 
each node of the seven networks visualized in Figures S1 and 
S2 in Supplemental Material. It shows that, overall, symbolic 
components were more central than operational components 
in terms of strength, d = 0.80, 95% CI = [0.49, 1.12], F(1, 
204) = 35.01, p < .001; closeness, d = 0.78, 95% CI = 
[0.47, 1.09], F(1, 204) = 172.54, p < .001; and betweenness, 
d = 0.97, 95% CI = [0.65, 1.29], F(1, 204) = 40.19, p < .001 
(results replicate using nonparametric methods). That is, 
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consistent with the symbolic centric hypothesis, symbolic 
(vs. operational) components are more closely 
connected to their immediate neighbors in the network 
(strength), are more closely connected to all of the other 
nodes in the network (closeness), and help tie different nodes 
in the network together (betweenness). These findings repli-
cated across waves (i.e., they were not moderated by the year 
of the survey). Notably, there is an overlap in the distribution 
of centrality estimates of symbolic and operational compo-
nents. This suggests that individual operational components 
may have particularly high levels of centrality and that indi-
vidual symbolic components may have particularly low lev-
els of centrality, but that symbolic components are on average 
the most central. Although this is what one expects to find 
when analyzing nearly any kind of continuous variable, in 
this research domain it highlights that there is a range of cen-
trality estimates and that the central versus peripheral distinc-
tion is a quantitative (not a qualitative) difference.
Additional checks. We conducted a number of additional 
checks on these results that are described in the Supplemen-
tal Materials. To ensure that the results were not due to the 
specific items available in any given wave, we repeated all 
analyses with items available in at least six of the seven 
waves. The results were the same. To check if the results 
were affected by the distribution of centrality scores across 
the waves, we ranked and standardized the centrality scores 
within each wave. Symbolic components were still the most 
central. To test if the networks differed between people with 
higher or lower levels of education and political knowledge, 
we estimated additional networks for these subgroups and 
compared the resulting networks. The relative centrality of 
symbolic and operational components did not differ based on 
political knowledge or education. This indicates that, while 
the belief systems of people from these groups do differ (for 
reviews see Converse, 2000; Federico & Malka, 2018), they 
do not differ in the extent to which symbolic components are 
more central than operational components.
How Are Components Related to Behavior?
Network estimation. We estimated two additional networks 
that included nodes to represent voting and environmental 
behavior: one that combined the belief system data from 
Wave 3 (in 2011 before the election) with the behavior data 
from Wave 4 (in 2012 after the election; n = 4,190), and one 
with both belief system and behavior data from Wave 4 (after 
the election; n = 5,829). We estimated regularized partial 
correlation networks and treated voting behavior as a categor-
ical variable with more than two categories, similar to a mul-
tinomial regression analysis (Haslbeck & Waldorp, 2016). 
The edges between the nodes and voting behavior thus reflect 
the absolute value of the average effect of the nodes on voting 
behavior across the categories (i.e., how much a node is asso-
ciated with participants’ voting decision, regardless of the 
particular party). The edges between the remaining nodes 
reflect partial correlations. To measure the closeness of 
behavior to the nodes in the network, for each node of the two 
behavior networks, we calculated the distance of its shortest 
path between the node and each of the behavioral nodes using 
Dijkstra’s (1959) algorithm. Shorter paths are closer in the 
network. Figure 2 displays these networks.
Figure 1. Symbolic components (n = 56) are higher in strength, closeness, and betweenness centrality than operational components  
(n = 162) across the seven belief system networks.
Higher values imply higher centrality. Points represent individual nodes from networks estimated from all seven waves of data (visualized in Figures S1 and 
S2 in Supplemental Material). Points are horizontally jittered to improve clarify. Top and bottom edges of the boxes represent upper and lower bounds of 
the 95% confidence interval of the mean. The centerline of the box represents the mean. Closeness was multiplied by 100 before plotting to reduce the 
number of leading zeros.
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For each of the four behavioral nodes, we tested whether 
symbolic components or operational components had shorter 
paths to the behavioral nodes. The lower the value, the more 
central (i.e., close to behaviors) the component. Accordingly, 
Figure 3 shows that symbolic components of the belief sys-
tem were closer than operational components to voting 
behavior, d = −2.43, 95% CI = [–3.19, −1.67], F(1, 55) = 
61.21, p < .001. Environmental and religious behaviors are 
not as close to the belief system as a whole (perhaps reflect-
ing their less clear connection with politics compared to vot-
ing behavior). However, the difference between symbolic 
and operational components was also found for changes in 
routines, d = −1.62, 95% CI = [−2.31, −0.95], F(1, 55) 
= 27.45, p < .001, and sacrifices made, d = −1.71, 95% 
CI = [−2.40, −1.02], F(1, 55) = 30.32, p < .001, that benefit 
the environment, as well as religious behavior, d = −0.74, 
95% CI = [−1.37, −0.11], F(1, 55) = 5.92, p < .001. These 
differences replicated across the 2 years (i.e., the results were 
not moderated by year) and were robust to the inclusion and 
exclusion of different nodes in the network, as well as across 
levels of education and political knowledge (see Supplemental 
Materials for full results). Notably, there is an overlap in the 
distribution of shortest paths, suggesting that individual 
operational components may have particularly close associa-
tions with political behavior. Nevertheless, symbolic compo-
nents are on average the most central.
Discussion
By combining network psychometrics with research on oper-
ational and symbolic components of belief systems, we were 
Figure 2. Belief system networks with symbolic (black nodes), operational (gray nodes), and behavioral (white nodes) components.
Solid edges are positive. Dashed edges are negative. Thicker edges represent stronger connections between nodes. Placement of the nodes is 
determined with multidimensional scaling of the absolute value of the adjacency matrix (Jones, Mair, & McNally, 2018). Node labels are described in 
Table 1.
Figure 3. Symbolic components (n = 14) are more closely 
connected (have shorter paths) with behaviors than operational 
components (n = 45).
Lower values imply higher centrality. Points represent individual nodes 
from both panels of Figure 2. Points are horizontally jittered to improve 
clarity. Top and bottom edges of the boxes represent upper and lower 
bounds of the 95% confidence interval of the mean. The centerline of the 
box represents the mean.
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able to model the belief system in a way that matches theo-
retical definitions of the construct while using a large number 
of elements of the political belief system. This allowed us to 
examine how different types of nodes are situated within the 
broad belief system. We found, and replicated across multiple 
years, that symbolic components of the belief system were 
more central than operational components to the overall sys-
tem and were closer to multiple types of politically relevant 
behavior. That is, when it comes to political belief systems, 
our symbolic attachments to parties and labels are a more 
important part of the belief system than the actual policy posi-
tions. This echoes work that has used less comprehensive 
methods for probing the deep structure of political belief sys-
tems (Converse, 1964; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017; Malka & 
Lelkes, 2010) and those that have used other variations of the 
network approach (Boutyline & Vaisey, 2017).
Other Explanations for Variation in Centrality?
Notably, not all operational components are created equally 
and they are not all equally peripheral to the belief system. 
Indeed, some operational components are substantially more 
central than the average symbolic component. This suggests 
that some operational components can serve as relatively more 
central components to the belief system, at least in some situ-
ations. For example, across the 7 years, the operational item 
about teaching Māori (i.e., the indigenous peoples of New 
Zealand) language in public school (node “Mlan” in Figure 2) 
was in the top 73% to 96% of nodes for strength centrality, the 
top 66% to 78% of nodes for closeness centrality, and the top 
71% to 97% of nodes for betweenness centrality, suggesting 
that, overall, it was a relatively central component. One pos-
sible explanation is that this item taps into other types of group 
attachments (e.g., ethnic group) that are relevant for politics in 
New Zealand, contaminating this operational node with sym-
bolic content (e.g., a type of symbolic racism; Sears & Henry, 
2005). And indeed, such arguments have been made for why 
some attitudes are more closely connected to ideological or 
partisan identification in the United States than are other atti-
tudes (e.g., Converse, 1964; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017).
However, other operational items are also related to group 
attachments to some degree and these items are not consis-
tently central (e.g., issues regarding immigration with India 
and China, or the role of women in the workforce). One pos-
sibility is that it is not just group attachments per se that 
account for this variability, but the extent an issue is “hard” 
(i.e., requires deliberation, is complex) or “easy” (i.e., comes 
from the “gut,” more symbolic than technical; Carmines & 
Stimson, 1980). This is also unlikely to be the whole story as 
many issues likely to be “easy” are not particularly central 
(e.g., the aforementioned trade and immigration items, an 
item about performing the Haka, etc.).
To more formally test this idea, we divided the items into 
items tapping into social policies and those tapping eco-
nomic policies (a few items were ambiguous and were not 
included here). Our assumption is that, on average, social 
policies represent easy issues and economic policies repre-
sent hard issues. When centrality of these two subtypes are 
compared, we only find significant differences for strength 
centrality (p = .04), where social policies are slightly more 
strength central than economic policies. Although this is con-
sistent with the idea that easy issues will be more central, it 
is far from conclusive.
Just as some operational components are particularly cen-
tral, there is substantial variation in the centrality of the sym-
bolic components. One distinction that has occupied scholars 
is the relative centrality of partisan versus ideological forms 
of symbolic components. That is, is party support/identifica-
tion or ideological identification more central? The most cur-
rent evidence suggests that party identity is more central than 
ideological identity (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017; see also Green 
et al., 2002). To formally test this idea in our data, we divided 
the items into those tapping into party support/identity and 
those tapping into ideological identification. A clear limita-
tion of this analysis is the low number of items assessing 
ideological identification (only 1 or 2 per year). With this 
caveat in mind, we only find significant differences between 
party support/identity and ideology for strength centrality 
(p = .03) in that the partisan support components are slightly 
more strength central than ideological identification. 
Although these results are consistent with the idea that party 
identity will be more central, it is again far from conclusive.
Understanding what is associated with network centrality 
beyond symbolic and operational categories will be an 
important task for future work. By allowing us to test what 
type of component is most central and to quantify the cen-
trality of all of the individual nodes, our approach allows for 
a more continuous understanding of belief system centrality 
than the typical approaches used in the literature, which tend 
to encourage dichotomous categorizations of central versus 
peripheral components.
Limitations and Future Directions
Our approach does have its limitations. By conducting cross-
sectional analyses, the edges of the networks have no clear 
causal meaning. Although they represent potential causal 
links between nodes, the analyses have all of the same short-
comings as any cross-sectional analysis. Nevertheless, the 
support we find for the symbolic centric hypothesis is consis-
tent with experimental work showing that policy issues 
extend from our party and ideological attachments (i.e., sym-
bolic operational) and so serves as a complement, rather than 
a replacement, to experimental approaches that focus on dif-
ferent subsections of the belief system (e.g., Huddy et al., 
2015; Kahan et al., 2017; Malka & Lelkes, 2010). This limi-
tation does raise the question of what is centrality without the 
causal component (i.e., what is centrality in this study)? 
There are two responses to this question. First, it may be pos-
sible that some components with high centrality are never the 
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cause and only the consequence of other components. 
Although we find this possibility unlikely, it is still be illumi-
nating to know if there is a component of the belief system 
that the other components of the system cause. It would sug-
gest the focus of that particular belief system. However, this 
is not our favored answer. Rather, a second response to this 
question is that there is causal information gathered from a 
number of rigorous experimental and quasi-experimental 
studies throughout the years (and cited throughout). When 
those conclusions are combined with the current data, we 
know both where symbolic and operational components are 
situated in the system as a whole (our data) and what the 
causal direction is (experimental work). Both types of data 
are needed to make convincing claims of centrality.
Our cross-sectional analyses also mean that the networks 
we estimate are primarily applicable for describing between-
person differences and similarities in attitudes and beliefs 
(Epskamp et al., 2017). That is, these belief system networks 
are not a snapshot inside of any one person’s head, but rather, 
they capture a summary of the attitudinal and belief-based 
cleavages between people. Future studies, with intensive 
longitudinal data (e.g., over 40 time points), may be able to 
take advantage of additional methods that can estimate indi-
vidualized networks that provide snapshots of a given per-
son’s belief system and how it evolves over time (cf. 
Bringmann et al., 2013).
The findings provide guidance for people and politicians 
who want to attach new issues to a political belief system. By 
linking new issues with symbolic components, such as party 
attachments or other political labels, it should be easier to 
embed the new issue within the broader network of attitudes 
and beliefs. For the researcher, our results also suggest that 
symbolic components of the belief system are key to predict-
ing where people will fall on new issues or politically rele-
vant behaviors, whereas issue-based measures are less 
relevant (cf. Dalege, Borsboom, Harreveld, Waldorp, & van 
der Maas, 2017). Going further, the belief system networks 
we estimate might be used to identify which issues may be 
more amenable to change by entrepreneurial politicians and 
parties (e.g., De Vries & Hobolt, 2012) because they are rela-
tively loosely connected to the rest of the belief system.
Our methodological approach can also open other new 
doors. For example, although the belief systems we esti-
mated have a large number of connections between compo-
nents, many of these connections are weak. However, it 
should be possible to identify the most constrained and inter-
related subsections of the belief system to identify “small 
ideologies” that are the topics where people will have the 
most consistent, stable, and interconnected opinions. And 
then to use these belief system networks and their various 
subcomponents to dynamically model how belief systems 
are expected to change over time, or when facing social pres-
sures (Friedkin, Proskurnikov, Tempo, & Parsegov, 2016).
Overall, by modeling belief systems as networks, we are 
able to locate specific attitudes and beliefs within a larger 
and more complete belief system. In doing so, we demon-
strate that symbolic components are more central to the 
belief system and are closer to politically relevant behavior 
than are operational components. Such a network approach 
provides a modeling approach that matches the conceptual 
definition of belief systems and opens the door to new 
research at the intersection of belief systems research and 
network science.
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